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Non-Technical Summary
In the empirical economic literature on labor standards and economic performance,
the adoption of international labor standards is measured by the rati¯cation of ILO Con-
ventions and is treated as an exogenous variable that explains labor costs, growth, exports
or inward foreign direct investment. Thus the rati¯cation of ILO Conventions is assumed to
be correlated with higher labor standards in the ratifying country. But in popular discus-
sions, the ILO is characterized as having no \teeth" to enforce standards, and rati¯cation
is often characterized as having no substantial meaning. Which view is nearer to the truth?
This paper develops a framework where a country's decision to ratify is made simul-
taneously with the decision on degree of implementation, taking into account the costs and
bene¯ts. Without an international standard, a country has a \natural" standard that it
would adopt. A system of international standards changes the cost-bene¯t calculus since
there may be costs of not adopting the international standard, costs which may di®er
depending on whether the country rati¯es or does not ratify an ILO Convention. It is
shown that if there were no di®erence at all in the costs of deviating from an international
standard, for a country which rati¯es compared to a country which does not, rati¯cation
should not have any systematic empirical determinants. On the other hand, if we do ¯nd
systematic determinants of rati¯cation, this suggests that rati¯cation is not costless and,
moreover, rati¯cation is indeed correlated with higher domestic standards.
The rest of the paper is devoted to an empirical investigation of the time patterns of
rati¯cation for four core ILO Conventions - Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining;
Abolition of Forced labor; Discrimination; and Minimum Age - using rati¯cation and other
data for 97 countries from 1950 to 1992. We estimate the probability of rati¯cation for a
country in any year, given that it has not so far rati¯ed the Convention. In contrast to the
emphasis put on them in the theoretical and some of the empirical literature, we ¯nd that
basic economic variables - real income per capita, degree of openness to trade, education
levels, degree of urbanization - do not explain the probability of rati¯cation. Neither does
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the political rights variable, which has been suggested by some theorists.
The two key variables which matter are legal systems and peer e®ects. Legal sys-
tems are classi¯ed according to their origins as belonging to one of ¯ve types - British
common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law and socialist law.
Countries with Scandinavian civil law have higher probability of ratifying the Conventions,
while countries whose legal systems have origins in socialist law have lower probability of
rati¯cation. It is argued that this may well be connected to the quality of enforcement
and e±ciency that is characteristic of these di®erent systems.
For two of the four Conventions (Right to Organize and Abolition of Forced La-
bor), peer e®ects are important. The probability of rati¯cation is higher the greater is
the number of countries from a reference group who have already signed. We consider
three reference groups in turn { export orientation (¯ve categories), level of development
(two categories) and geographical region (seven categories). Each speci¯cation yields sta-
tistically signi¯cant e®ects, even after we introduce a time variable to take into account
the fact that rati¯cations have generally increased over time. Such peer e®ects suggest
empirical support for the hypothesis of \strategic complementarity" in labor standards {
the bene¯ts to a country from adopting a standard increase with the number of countries
who have already adopted that standard.
While there are variations across the Conventions in terms of their determinants, the
basic fact is that for all the four Conventions considered we are able to ¯nd determinants
which explain rati¯cation. Returning to the theoretical framework, therefore, the empirical
analysis suggests that rati¯cation of an ILO Convention is not random and meaningless.
There are costs to rati¯cation, and countries which ratify are likely to have higher domestic
standards.
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1 Introduction
In the empirical literature on labor standards and economic performance, the adoption of
international labor standards is measured by the rati¯cation of ILO Conventions and is
treated as an exogenous variable that explains labor costs, growth, exports or inward for-
eign direct investment. For example, OECD (1996) attempts to relate aggregate and labor
intensive exports to the rati¯cation of ILO Conventions. No relationship is found, which is
interpreted by some as suggesting that there are no economic costs to the adoption of labor
standards. But Mah (1997), who also investigates the role of labor standards on export
performance, ¯nds a negative association between the rati¯cation of certain \core" ILO
Conventions and performance. Rodrik (1996) tries to explain manufacturing labor costs
and ¯nds that the number of Conventions rati¯ed is statistically signi¯cant. Palley (1999)
¯nds a positive association between economic growth and the rati¯cation of the Freedom
of Association Convention. But Rama (1995) argues that the number of ILO Conventions
rati¯ed is not signi¯cant as a determinant of growth performance in Latin America.
Throughout this empirical literature, therefore, the rati¯cation of ILO Conventions
is assumed to provide information on labor standards adopted and implemented in a coun-
try. The object of this paper is to investigate the determinants of rati¯cation directly and,
indirectly, the determinants of labor standards. It presents an empirical analysis of the
time patterns and determinants of rati¯cation. Despite the relative lack of emphasis on
enforcement and punishments associated with these Conventions, we ¯nd evidence sug-
gesting a process of self-selection and matching in which the probability of rati¯cation
depends on country characteristics. For example, we ¯nd that peer e®ects are in play. For
some Conventions, the probability of rati¯cation depends on how many other countries in
a peer group have already rati¯ed that Convention.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the ILO Core Conventions
that are the focus of interest, presents basic data on their rati¯cation and begins the dis-
cussion on basic time patterns in rati¯cation. Section 3 develops an analytical framework
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for the empirical analysis by considering the rati¯cation decision and its determinants.
Section 4 presents the econometric results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 ILO Core Conventions: Who Rati¯es and When
ILO Conventions are international treaties, subject to rati¯cation by member states. There
are now more than 180 Conventions on a wide array of subjects. But the ILO itself has
established a set of \core" labor standards. These standards are laid out in the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998) under four main
headings, as shown in Table 1. These constitute the eight fundamental Conventions of the
ILO.
However, the decision to ratify any of these Conventions remains the right of each
member nation, and it re°ects willingness on the part of the ratifying country to enact
legislation, and put in place mechanisms that facilitate implementation in practice. On
the part of the ILO, three types of mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance. First,
2systems of supervision are in place to improve transparency and to oversee compliance. A
second component of ILO activities that facilitate improvements of labor standards takes
the form of technical assistance and ¯nancial support, especially for the poorest countries.
Finally, in cases of violation where recommendations are not responded to, Article 33 of
the ILO constitution provides that members take \measures of an economic character"
against the violating country.
These mechanisms outline the extent to which there may be explicit costs and ben-
e¯ts associated with ratifying ILO Conventions. But what is repeatedly stressed in policy
and popular writings is that sanctions against non-complying members have very rarely
been invoked. And it is generally agreed that the ILO lacks \teeth" to enforce implemen-
3tation of Conventions that have been rati¯ed. But if it was true that countries faced
2See Elliot (2000) for an indepth discussion of the three basic tools { referred to therein as \sunshine",
\carrots", and \sticks" { employed to enforce labor standards by the ILO.
3In a recent high pro¯le case, the governing body of the ILO invoked Article 33 (Failure to carry
out recommendation of Commission of Inquiry or International Court of Justice) in March 2000 for the
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no costs whatsoever (explicit or implicit) of complying, one might expect all countries
to ratify every Convention, assuming even a miniscule bene¯t of signing on. At least,
we would not expect any systematic connection between rati¯cation and actual domestic
standards, in which case the common use of rati¯cation data in the empirical literature on
labor standards would be questioned.
This paper will show that there are indeed systematic determinants of rati¯cation
for some Conventions, and that for these Conventions there is evidence to suggest that rat-
i¯cation of an international standard is an indicator of the domestic level of that standard.
But that will come in subsequent Sections. As a build up to that analysis we consider
now the broad time patterns of rati¯cation of four selected core Conventions { one from
each category in Table 1. Of the eight core Conventions, the last one, on Worst Forms
of Child Labor, 2000, (Convention 182, henceforth C182) is too recent to provide useful
information on time patterns of rati¯cation, so we choose C138 from the last category.
The economic data used in Section 4 goes back to 1950 and cannot cover the early period
of the Forced Labor Convention, 1932 (C29), so we choose C105 from the second category.
Of the other two categories, we choose the later Conventions. This gives us C98 (Rights to
Organize), C105 (Abolition of Forced Labor), C111 (Discrimination) and C138 (Minimum
Age) as the four core Conventions that are the focus of this study.
Table 2 lists rati¯cation dates for each Convention from the ILOLEX database (ILO
2001), and date of independence where relevant for the 97 countries in our data set. The
Table shows up some interesting features. For example, the USA and Canada have not
signed the Right to Organize Convention. In fact, the USA has only signed one of the four
Conventions listed. European Countries were early signatories to the Right to Organize
Convention, except Switzerland, which waited till 1999. In general, there seems to be a
fair amount of variation in who rati¯ed which convention and when.
very ¯rst time, and approved a resolution in condemnation of the government of Myanmar. The resolution
condemned Myanmar's failure to comply with Convention No. 29 (forced labor convention), and her failure
to take actions in response to the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the use of forced
labor. But the unusualness of this illustrates the lack of explicit enforcement of ILO Conventions.
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Figures 1-4 plot frequency distributions of rati¯cation by year of rati¯cation. For
C98, C105 and C111 the peak frequency comes near the start while for C138 the frequency
is low and constant in the ¯rst two decades. For all four Conventions, there was clearly
a surge of rati¯cation from the second half of the 1990s onwards. As elaborated in ILO
(2001), this might be attributed to the ILO campaign launched in May 1995 following the
World Summit on Children. Another development since 1995 with a similarly \supply-
side" orientation was the declaration of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore
in 1996, which underscored the commitment of participating member nations to observe
internationally recognized core labor standards, and declared the ILO as the \competent
body to set and deal with these standards" (WTO 1996). The break in the frequency of
rati¯cation dates would seem to be particularly acute for C138, the minimum age Con-
vention. Between 1997 and 2001, 46 countries rati¯ed this Convention, as compared to
the 59 countries that rati¯ed in all its previous 20 years of its existence. Our econometric
analysis in Section 4 is restricted to the years 1950 to 1992 because of data limitations, but
future analyses will have to consider and allow for this late surge in rati¯cations carefully.
For a typical Convention, let t denote the e®ective years between promulgation of ai
Convention by the ILO and its rati¯cation by country i. If ¿ is the year of promulgation,0
and T the year of independence of country i, de¯ne,i
¿ ´ maxf¿ ; T g;i0 0 i
Then, if ¿ is the year of rati¯cation by country i,i
t = ¿ ¡ ¿ :i i i0
Let the probability that country i rati¯es a convention no later than t years be given by:i
F (t )i
with an associated density function
f(t ):i
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The \survival rate", that is, the probability of not having rati¯ed the Convention when
time t has passed, is of coursei
S(t ) = 1¡ F (t ):i i
Figures 5-8 summarize information on time elapsed to rati¯cation for each of the four
Conventions, in the form of estimates of the survival function 1¡F (t). The Kaplan-Meier
estimate of the survival function (Neumann 1999), is given by:
tY ds
(1¡ ):
nss=1
where d is the number countries that rati¯es the Convention between t and t+1 years aftert
¿ , and n is the number of countries that have not yet rati¯ed the Convention at timei0 t
t. The survival curves estimated for each Convention, i.e. the probability that rati¯cation
does not take place after t years have elapsed, are plotted in Figures 5 - 8 for developing
and developed countries separately.
The Figures show that developing countries were by and large late adopters of C98
(Right to Organize), C105 (Abolition of Forced Labor) and C138 (Minimum Age), but the
survival probabilities for developed and developing countries appear to be similar for C111
(Discrimination). Moreover, the di®erent Conventions took very di®erent lengths of time
to get rati¯ed. The time elapsed for the survival probability for developing countries to fall
to a half is about 3 years for C105, while it had not fallen to half after 20 years for C138.
For C98 and C111 it was around 10 years. This variation across country groupings and
across Conventions suggests that rati¯cation is not simply a random occurrence, unrelated
to underlying socio-economic determinants. The next section begins the detailed task of
understanding the rati¯cation decision.
3 The Decision to Ratify
How are we to think about the determinants of the adoption or otherwise of international
labor standards? One way to approach this is in two steps. First, imagine a world in which
there are no international labor standards. Then we can model a country's optimal choice
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of standards as re°ecting di®erent costs and bene¯ts of adopting the given standard. Sec-
ond, superimpose on this a system and mechanism of international labor standards. The
country decides whether or not to adopt them and enforce them depending on the costs
and bene¯ts of adoption and compliance. What we observe, namely the rati¯cation of ILO
Conventions, then has these two components intricately entwined.
Let
W = U(s) (1)
be the welfare of a country that implements domestic standard s when there is no inter-
4national standards regime. Now suppose an international labor standards regime comes
into being, requiring as standard s^. Should the country sign on? We suppose that when
there is an international regime, the welfare of a country which does not ratify is given by:
0 0W (s; s^) = U(s)¡ V (s; s^) (2)
0 0where V (¢) is a cost function dependent on s and s^. We suppose that V (¢) is positive
for s^ > s, and zero otherwise { in other words, there are no costs to deviating from the
international standard in the upward direction.
Now consider what happens when a country rati¯es the international standard. We
suppose that there is a ¯xed gain of B at signing. This can be thought of in a number
of di®erent ways, including for poorer countries, access to technical assistance and other
support which signing on makes possible. Moreover, B could also be negative if, for
example, the domestic political economy views signing as \caving in" to international
demands or as unnecessarily restricting room for future maneuver. However, signing on
also intensi¯es the costs of deviating from the international standard, so that welfare after
signing on is
00 00W (s; s^) = U(s) +B ¡ V (s; s^) (3)
4The actual form of this function may vary depending on the speci¯c stanard and the context. For a
speci¯c form in the context of trade competition, see Chau and Kanbur (2000).
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00with V also having the property that it is positive for s^ > s and zero otherwise, and
furthermore
00 0V > V for all (s; s^):
The country's problem can now be characterized as follows. First of all, choose s to
0 00maximize (2) and (3). Then compare the maximized values of W and W to decide on
rati¯cation. It will turn out that the value of s which maximizes (1) will also be relevant
0 00to this decision, so, in obvious notation, let ~s, ~s and ~s be the values of s which maximize
0 00~ ~ ~(1), (2) and (3) respectively, and let W , W and W be the corresponding maximized
values of welfare in the three regimes. Then clearly the choice of rati¯cation depends on
00 0~ ~¢W = W ¡W
00 0 00 00 0 0= B + [U(~s )¡ U(~s )] + [V (~s ; s^)¡ V (~s ; s^)]: (4)
To get a sharper insight into the determinants of the rati¯cation decision, consider
the following highly speci¯c functional forms:
1 2U(s) = ¯s¡ s (5)
2(
1 0 2µ (s^¡ s) if s < s^0 2V (s; s^) = (6)
0 if s ¸ s^(
1 00 2µ (s^¡ s) if s < s^00 2V (s; s^) = (7)
0 if s ¸ s^;
where ¯ is positive and represents the country-speci¯c marginal gains from implementing
00 0domestic standard s, and µ and µ parameterize respectively the marginal costs of de-
viating from the international standard s^, depending on whether or not the country has
rati¯ed the standard.
With these functional forms, (5) implies that
~s = ¯ (8)
and thus ¯ gives the optimal standard in the absence of an international standards regime.
We refer to this as the \natural" domestic standard. Restricting attention ¯rst to the case
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where ¯ < s^, we get
0¯ + µ s^0~s = (9)01 + µ
00¯ + µ s^00~s = : (10)001 + µ
0 00It is straightforward to verify that ~s > ~s and ~s > ~s whenever the marginal costs of
0 00deviating from the international standard µ and µ are strictly positive. In addition,
0 00 0 00 0 00~s < s^ and ~s < s^ so long as µ and µ are ¯nite. If we further simplify µ and µ to
0 ¹ ¹µ = µ ¡ ±; ± < µ (11)
00 ¹µ = µ + ±: (12)
it follows that µ ¶
2±00 0~s ¡ ~s = (s^¡ ~s); (13)
2 2¹(1 + µ) ¡ ±
and the welfare of a country that rati¯es the international standard changes by
± 2¢W = B ¡ (s^¡ ~s) : (14)
2 2¹(1 + µ) ¡ ±
Finally, when ¯ ¸ s^, we get
0 00~s = ~s = ¯; ¢W = B: (15)
From equation (14), the rati¯cation decision is seen to depend not only upon the
\natural standard" for a country, ~s, but also the relative marginal costs of not enforcing
the international standard, as captured in ±. The higher is the natural standard in a
country, the more likely it is to ratify, and the greater is the relative cost of not enforcing
when it does ratify, the less likely it is to ratify. Equations (13), (14) and (15) together
also tell us that provided ±6= 0, the standard in a ratifying country is no lower than the
standard in a non-ratifying country.
In the empirical context, if we think of B as being an unobservable term not sys-
tematically related to labor standards, equations (13), (14) and (15) can help us to draw
inferences from the econometric analysis of rati¯cation. In particular, if we ¯nd no sys-
tematic determinants of rati¯cation, it follows that ~s ¸ s^, or ± = 0. If s^ > ~s, which seems
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a reasonable assumption for many countries, then an implication of the allegation that
deviation from international standards is almost totally costless, is that we should not ¯nd
systematic determinants of rati¯cation. On the other hand, if we do ¯nd systematic de-
terminants of rati¯cation in the data, this implies both that ±6= 0, and that s^ > ~s. In this
case, using (13) and (14), it also implies that actual standards with rati¯cation are higher
than actual standards without, which of course is the implicit assumption in the empirical
literature on labor standards and performance, and it justi¯es the use of rati¯cation as a
measure of labor standards.
The key issue is then whether we can in fact ¯nd systematic determinants of rati¯-
cation in terms of systemtaic determinants of ~s (the \natural" standard) and ± (the costs
of deviating from an international standard). Taking ~s ¯rst, the existing theoretical liter-
ature can be interpreted as providing at least ¯ve explanations for the choice of particular
labor standards by a given country: (i) a by-product of the type of industrial and labor
relations adopted in the development process; (ii) a consequence of greater openness to
trade; (iii) a response to domestic political in°uences; (iv) a strategic response to labor
standards set in peer countries; and (v) a legacy of a country's legal origin.
Taking the rapid growth of the East Asian newly industrialized economies and the
subsequent improvement in labor standards in these countries as a backdrop, Fields (1990)
distinguishes between direct and indirect promotion of labor standards. Direct promotion
involves aggressive programs aimed at regulating labor standards in the work place. Indi-
rect measures put emphasis on growth, and improvements in employment opportunities,
wage income and other labor standards follow as by products of the growth process. In-
deed, many newly industrialized economies underwent periods of wage repression policies
(Fields and Wan 1989), wherein restrictions on union activities, strikes and collective bar-
5gaining in the name of export-oriented industrialization were employed. In this view,
then, an increase in per capita income (or labor productivity) increases the likelihood of
5Also see Kuruvilla (1996) which documents the link between industrial growth and policies on labor
standards in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and India, and ¯nds that export oriented policies were
implemented alongside repression on labor rights.
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stronger labor standards in that country.
Rodrik (1996) argues that opening to trade makes standards more costly to main-
tain. In particular, the producer cost of high standards can be passed on to consumers
via higher prices in closed economies, but the entire burden of the costs of high standards
may be borne by producers if prices are determined competitively in the world market.
In contrast, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that import competition need not be an
enemy of high labor standards. If openness to trade reduces the social costs of raising
labor standards in import competing sectors, opening up an economy to trade can in fact
enhance governments' incentive to adopt higher labor standards.
Brown (2000) discusses the role of a well-functioning democracy in government reg-
ulation of labor standards. In particular, if high labor standards also have the e®ect of
improving worker-employer relations, the policy choice in democratic societies will likely
be a revelation of these bene¯ts of high labor standards. Political rights thus emerge as
an important determinant. Cassella (1996) considers two democratic trading economies,
where the median voter is decisive in the choice of labor standards. If free trade leads to
factor price equalization, and if the median voter in one country is a skilled worker, there
may be a higher preference for higher standards than for an increase in employment op-
portunities there, compared to the case where the median voter in the other country is an
unskilled worker. The skill composition of the workforce, which we measure here in terms
of schooling, thus emerges as another possible explanation for di®ering labor standards
across countries.
Portes (1990) o®ers a di®erent perspective on the globalization and labor standards
linkage. Rather than re°ecting workers' needs, labor standards in developing countries are
in°uenced by ideas, values and institutional forms imported from abroad. But the segmen-
tation of the workforce into those that are protected, and those that are not is a key factor
underlying the emergence and growth of the informal sector. For example, Sabot (1990)
documents the development strategy of Tanzania in the early 1960s, and argues that mas-
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sive rural-urban migration was symptomatic of import substituting development policies
in the post-independence period, favoring high wages and high standards in the unionized
urban formal sector. Thus \urban bias", which might be measured ceteris paribus by the
degree of urbanization, could also play a role in determining labor standards in a country.
In the theoretical literature, labor standards in a given country have also been ex-
amined as a strategic response to labor standards set in peer countries. In particular, Chau
and Kanbur (2000) examine the possibility of a race to the bottom in labor standards in
the context of export competition among developing economies. It is shown that whether
labor standards are strategic complements or substitutes depends critically on the nature
of the import demand curves. Strategic complementarity here is de¯ned as whether the
adoption of high labor standards in one country raises the net bene¯ts of raising standards
in another country. Basu and Chau (2000) and Basu, Chau and Grote (2000) examine
the possibility of a race to the top in the context of product labeling. These papers which
emphasize strategic interaction suggest that peer e®ects will be in play { the adoption of
a standard in one country may be in°uenced, for example, by how many countries in its
competitor group have also adopted that standard.
Finally, since the rati¯cation of international labor standards is after all a govern-
ment undertaking to uphold the rights of labor, one may also expect that institutional
determinants such as legal origins to have a signi¯cant bearing on the desire to improve
labor standards. In particular, countries with socialist laws may be characterized by the
predominance of the State's intent to control the ownership and allocation of resources,
rather than to protect property and individual freedom. Civil law countries are also char-
acterized by the intent to build institutions to further the power of the state, although to
a lesser degree as compared to the socialist tradition. Common law countries, in contrast,
put emphasis on the private rights of individuals, and as such, the power of the state to
intervene in the market place may be expected to be limited (David and Brierely 1978).
Dividing the legal origins of countries into British common law, French civil law, German
civil law, Scandinavian civil law and socialist law, La Porta et al. (1999) ¯nd that govern-
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ment performance in terms of public goods provision, bureaucratic e±ciency, protection
of property rights and the degree of market intervention vary signi¯cantly across countries
with di®erent legal origins. At one end of the spectrum, socialist countries are found to
have less e±cient and highly interventionist governments. Meanwhile, common law coun-
tries are found to be most market oriented. In addition, La Porta et al. (1998) ¯nd that
Scandinavian legal origin ranks highest in terms of the e±ciency of the judicial system
and the rule of law. In the context of labor standards, legal origin may thus in°uence
the natural labor standard (i) directly via the ideological bias it imposes on the relative
importance of the State vis-µa-vis the individual, and (ii) indirectly via its in°uence on the
performance of government to protect the rights of individuals and government e±ciency.
There is thus no single unifying theory of the determinants of domestic labor stan-
dards, and several diverse strands are present in the literature. A number of explanatory
variables are suggested by this literature: per capita income and the level of development
generally, the skill composition of the population, the degree of urbanization, political
openness, openness to trade, labor standards in peer countries and legal systems. These
variables would determine, in theory, the labor standard that a country would choose to
put in place { the ~s of equation (8).
Let us now turn to the determination of ±. The key here is to think about how
constraining the signing of a Convention would be for a country, and for what sorts of
countries these constraints would be lesser or greater. There is almost no detailed theo-
rizing on this issue in the literature. However, we would a priori expect peer e®ects to be
important. We have already identi¯ed peer e®ects as being important in determining the
\natural" standard for a country. But the costs of deviation from a rati¯ed convention are
also plausibly subject to peer e®ects. Two opposing arguments come to mind. One says
that the more countries that have signed on, the greater will be the peer groups in°icted
sanctions (economic or otherwise) costs for a country that has signed on when it deviates
from the international standard, relative to if it had not signed on at all. In other words,
the more countries that have signed on, the higher we would expect ± to be and hence
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peer e®ects would work to lower the likelihood of adoption of the international standard
through this channel.
0 00But there is a second argument. One may think of di®erences between µ and µ in
terms of the di®erence in the expected marginal cost of deviation. For any given cost of
deviating from an international labor standard, the expected marginal cost of deviation
depends on the probabilities of being discovered employing a standard s · s^. A natural
assumption here would be that the probability of discovery is higher for countries that
have rati¯ed the convention. However, it can be argued that as more and more countries
in a peer group sign on, the perceived likelihood that one among the entire pool of peer
countries will be discovered violating the standard can reasonably be expected to be lower.
We then have ± decreasing in the cumulative number of countries in the peer group.
The impact of peer e®ects on rati¯cation is thus ambiguous in theory and open to
empirical testing. However, one interesting issue is the identi¯cation of the peer group. For
the determination of the \natural" domestic standard, as discussed earlier, the peer group
consists of countries that are competitors in export markets or in the attraction of foreign
investment. For the costs and bene¯ts of signing per se, it is perhaps a broader community
of nations that is relevant as the peer group. Moreover, this type of peer e®ect may be
very di®erent for rich and poor countries. It might be argued that richer countries can
better bear the costs of ostracization from not signing. We might expect, then, this type of
peer e®ect to be more pronounced among developing countries than among developed ones.
The intricacy of the causal relationships induced by the two-stage process described
above should now be clear. The same variables are in principle involved in both stages, and
the e®ects through ~s and through ± may be di±cult to disentangle. However, we can draw
the following additional conclusions from the reasoning: (i) peer e®ects will be present in
both stages-the empirical key may lie in de¯ning reference groups which pick up on the ¯rst
stage or second stage e®ects; (ii) non-compliance peer e®ects may be stronger for poorer
countries than for richer countries; (iii) higher income will induce higher \natural" stan-
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dards and will therefore increase the propensity to ratify high international standards, but
this e®ect may be counteracted by the fact that the costs of non-compliance may be much
lower for a rich country than for a poorer country, so overall the income e®ect may be weak.
This concludes our theoretical discussion of the incentives for ratifying an interna-
tional labor standard. The theory has identi¯ed a number of variables as possible deter-
minants of rati¯cation. The next section tests the signi¯cance of these variables for our
data set.
4 Empirical Framework and Results
In order to uncover the empirical determinants of the likelihood of rati¯cation, we work
with an empirical framework that allows us to analyze the data on rati¯cation dates avail-
able from the ILOLEX (2001) data base. The interest here is to empirically ascertain the
likelihood of rati¯cation at a given point in time, and to discover in what ways economic,
demographic and political factors in°uence the time to rati¯cation. We thus estimate a
hazard model, with parameter estimates that can be interpreted as the change in the like-
lihood of rati¯cation at a given point in time, given that rati¯cation has not occured in
prior periods. We make use of a vector of time-varying explanatory variables x where tit
denotes the time after promulgation of the Convention or country independence, whichever
is later, and t runs from 0 till t , when the country rati¯es the Convention. Since onlyi
explanatory variables prior to t are to be used, the question of simultaneity does not arise.i
The vector x can be as comprehensive as theory requires and data allows. For example,it
in our case it includes information on how many other countries in country i's reference
group have also rati¯ed the Convention.
The hazard rate at t { the probability of rati¯cation when t years have passed, given
that rati¯cation has not taken place { is simply
f(t jx ))i it
h(t jx ) = :i it
1¡ F (t jx ))i it
We assume a model with proportional hazard (Cox(1972)), and specify in addition that
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each of the J time-varying covariates enter into the determinant of the hazard rate as
follows: PJ
¯ xj ijt^ j=1h(t jx ) = h(t )e : (16)i it i
^where h denotes the baseline hazard function. The hazard ratio for a unit change in xijt
is thus simply
¯je ¸ (<)1
Parameter estimates of ¯ of the Cox proportional hazard model are obtained by maxi-j
mizing a partial log-likelihood function (Kal°eisch and Prentice, 1980), and has the virtue
that the estimation procedure places no restrictions on the unknown functional form of
the baseline hazard function.
The variables required in the explanatory vector x are those suggested in the the-t
oretical discussion. Our data set covers 97 countries. Real GDP per capita (rgdpch) is
taken from the Penn World Table (Mark 5.6), and is available from 1950 through 1992.
The variable rgdpch measures output per capita in relation to a common set of interna-
tional prices based on a chain index (base 1985, in constant dollars). We take this to be a
proxy for the average productivity of labor. Educational attainment (educ), measured by
the ratio of total primary school enrollment to primary school age population, is obtained
from Alesina et. al. (1996) for 1950 to 1982, and from the Global Development Net-
work Growth database of the World Bank (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2001) for 1983 to 1992.
The extent of urbanization (urban) is also available from the World Bank database and
from the World Urbanization Prospects (United Nations, 1995). The Polity IV database
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2001) provides annual international ratings on political regimes,
with scores ranging from 10 (high democracy) to minus 10 (high autocracy). Missing data
points are assigned the polity score immediately prior to the missing point. For openness
we use imports and exports as a share of GNP from the Penn World Table. Legal origins
(British common law, German civil law, French civil law, Scandinavian civil law, socialist
law) are available from the GDN Growth database.
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We consider three types of peer e®ects. We ¯rst classify countries into groups of
countries based on their export orientation (exporters of manufactures, primary products,
6fuel, services and diversi¯ed exporters). A second classi¯cation divides countries into
developed (incdeveloping = 0) and developing countries (incdeveloping = 1), where de-
veloping countries refer to low, lower-middle and upper-middle level income countries as
7in Easterly and Sewadeh (2001). A ¯nal classi¯cation divides countries into seven geo-
graphic categories (East Asia and Paci¯c, South Asia, Sub Saharan African, Middle east
and Northern African, Latin America and Carribean, Eastern Europen and Central Asia,
Western Europe and North America). With these classi¯cations, we can construct mea-
sures of peer e®ects in each case. Thus when t years have passed without rati¯cation for a
country, cdev is the cumulative number of countries in the same development classi¯cationt
who have rati¯ed the convention in the previous t ¡ 1 years. Similarly export grouping
peer e®ects, and regional grouping peer e®ects are captured by the cex and creg variablest t
respectively.
For each Convention, we estimate the proportional hazard model ¯rst for the full
sample of developed and developing countries. The results are reported in Tables 3-6 for
each of the four Conventions. We present results for three speci¯cations, each with the
peer e®ects de¯ned in one of the three ways discussed above. The variable t is includedi
in all speci¯cations with peer e®ects variables to control for the e®ect of the passage of
time on rati¯cation. The results are reported in terms of the proportional impact on the
hazard rate of a unit increase in the explanatory variable { in other words, the estimate
of exp(¯). The last line of the Table gives the probability at which the hypothesis that all
coe±cients are zero can be rejected.
6Major exports are those that account for 50 percent or more of total exports of goods and services
from one category, in the period 1988-92. The categories are: nonfuel primary (SITC 0,1,2,4, plus 68),
fuels (SITC 3), manufactures (SITC 5 to 9, less 68), and services (factor and nonfactor service receipts plus
workers' remittances). If no single category accounts for 50 percent or more of total exports, the economy
is classi¯ed as diversi¯ed.
7These groupings are based on 1999 gross national income per capita. Gross national income per capita
is US$755 or less for low income countries; US$756- US$2,995 of lower middle income countries; US$2,996-
US$9,265 for upper middle income countries, and US$9,266 or more for high income countries.
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From Tables 3-6, four features stand out as being common to all Conventions. First,
the hypothesis that all coe±cients are zero is rejected for all Conventions. We have there-
fore found empirical determinants of the rati¯cation decision. As argued in the previous
section, this implies both that ± > 0, and that s^ > ~s. In other words, for these Con-
ventions, on average, the international standards are higher than the \natural" domestic
standard, and there are real di®erential costs to a country from ratifying and not meeting
the international standards, compared to not meeting standards when it has not rati¯ed
the Convention. Moreover, as established in the theory section, the combination of ± > 0
and s^ > ~s also implies that actual standards with rati¯cation are higher than actual stan-
dards without, a ¯nding of some importance to those who would use rati¯cation as a proxy
for domestic standards.
Turning now to the detailed determinants of rati¯cation, the second common feature
across all four tables is that the time variable is signi¯cant { the probability of rati¯cation
increases with the lapse of time. More interestingly, the third common feature is that the
legal system is a signi¯cant determinant of rati¯cation probability. For all four Conven-
tions, having a Scandinavian legal system increases the probability of rati¯cation (with
the exception of only one speci¯cation). A legal system with socialist origins, on the other
hand, decreases the probability of rati¯cation for all four Conventions. The French based
legal system in°uences probability of rati¯cation positively, but only for C111 and C138.
British and German legal systems are not signi¯cantly related to rati¯cation at all. It
should be noted that these patterns for the in°uence of legal systems on rati¯cation hold
even for the third of our speci¯cations, where regional peer e®ects are present { the legal
system e®ects can thus be argued to be over and above regional e®ects.
The fourth common feature across Tables 3-6 is the insigni¯cance of the basic \stan-
dard" variables (with very few exceptions). Real per capita GDP, Openness, Education,
Political Freedom, Urbanization { none of these seem to a®ect the probability of rati¯ca-
tion on average. On real per capita income, we identi¯ed con°icting forces in theory { as
income increases, the natural standard might be higher, but the cost from not meeting
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rati¯ed standards might be lower. The empirical result re°ects this ambiguity. On the
other variables, however, our empirical results suggest that some of the theories discussed
in the previous section need to be reconsidered carefully.
Consider now the role of peer e®ects. We see a clear distinction between C98 and
C105 on the one hand, and C111 and C138 on the other. In the latter case, no peer
e®ects are signi¯cant at all. For these Conventions, all that matters for the probability
of rati¯cation is the legal system. For C98 and C105, peer e®ects are strongly signi¯cant
and nonlinear { the likelihood of rati¯cation increases with the number of countries in
the reference group who have rati¯ed, but at a decreasing rate. Notice that these e®ects
are present even though the time variable has been introduced { this is not just case of
a spurious correlation brought about by \everybody ratifying eventually". The fact that
peer e®ects matter for C98 and C105 is a con¯rmation of the hypothesis of strategic com-
plementarity in labor standards, as discussed and developed in Chau and Kanbur (2000).
However, why peer e®ects should be important for some Conventions and not others is
something that will bear a closer, more institutional, investigation.
This concludes the presentation of our results for the full sample estimation. We
now turn to a closer look at two conventions, C98 and C105, in order to see if more can be
said regarding whether our explanatory variables are indeed picking up the endogeneity
of the natural labor standard ~s, or the relative costs of deviating from the international
standard (±). As a ¯rst pass, we explore this possibility by introducing a stage of develop-
ment dummy (incdeveloping) into the estimation. One interpretation of this is that the
stage of development dummy can be thought of as a rough guide as to whether a country's
\natural" standard exceeds, or lie below that of the international standard.
To recall, incdeveloping is equal to one (zero) for developing (developed) coun-
tries. We also introduce interaction terms that allow the sign and size of development
and regional peer e®ects to take on di®erent values respectively for developed and devel-
oping countries. Speci¯cally, the explanatory variable devcdev = incdeveloping £ cdevk k
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is equal to the development peer e®ect for developing countries, and zero for developed
countries, and devcdev sq denotes the corresponding interaction term with the nonlin-k
ear component of the development peer e®ect. The explanatory variable ndevcdev =k
j1 ¡ incdevelopingj £ cdev is equal to the development peer e®ect for developed coun-k
tries, and zero for developing countries. In a similar fashion, we denote devcreg andk
ndevcreg as the regional peer e®ect respectively for developed and developing countries,k
and devcreg sq and ndevcreg sq as the corresponding nonlinear terms. The objective ofk k
this exercise is to determine if there are systematic di®erences in the roles of development
and regional peer e®ects between high and low income countries.
8Tables 7 and 8 present the results for C98 and C105 respectively. In Table 7, the
results for the ¯rst model { where only the stage of development dummy is introduced {
suggest that developing countries are more likely to be late adopters of C98, although the
estimated coe±cient is insigni¯cant at the 10 percent level. Consistent with the full sample
analysis, real income per capita decreases the likelihood of early rati¯cation. The rest of
the economic explanatory variables are of the same sign as in the full sample estimation,
but are insigni¯cant. The results for legal origin variables likewise conform with the full
sample estimation, with Scandinavian and Socialist countries at the extremes in terms
of the likelihood of early rati¯cation. For this speci¯cation, the hypothesis that the es-
timated coe±cients are jointly di®erent from zero cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level.
Introducing peer e®ects into the analysis yields interesting di®erences, and in partic-
ular, both development and regional peer e®ects are shown to be positive and signi¯cant
only for the group of developing countries, but not for developed countries. Additionally,
real income per capita continues to negatively a®ect the likelihood of early rati¯cation.
Our measure of urban bias is positive and signi¯cant. Overall, the model with peer e®ects
is signi¯cant at the 1 percent level.
8We did the same analysis for the Discrimination and Minimum Age Conventions. In each case, we ¯nd
no model speci¯cations that yield parameter estimates that are jointly di®erent from zero at 15 percent
signi¯cance.
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Turning now to the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention in Table 8, we ¯nd that
in all three models, developing countries are more likely to be late adopters of C105, al-
though the estimated coe±cients are insigni¯cant in all three cases. Controlling for stage
of development also does not appear to improve the signi¯cance of the rest of the economic
variables, nor does it diminish the importance of legal origins in determining the likelihood
of early rati¯cation. However, as is the case with C98, development and regional peer ef-
fects are in play. The estimated hazard ratio is greater than one and signi¯cant only for
the group of developing countries, but not for developed countries. A hazard ratio that
is less than one for the nonlinear term indicates that development peer e®ects raises the
likelihood of early rati¯cation, but at a decreasing rate.
This analysis suggests that the \ostracization" and other peer e®ects (as captured
by ± in our model) may indeed be an important determinant of the observed rati¯cation
patterns for these two conventions. Ideally, of course, in order to explore the rati¯cation
decisions of countries with natural labor standards that exceed, or lie below that of the
international standard, one would need information on actual labor standards prior to the
adoption of the relevant labor convention by the ILO. Recall, however, from equations (8),
00(9) and (10), that ~s ¸ (<)s^ if and only if ~s ¸ (<)s^. This suggests that an alternative
approach would be to divide countries into two groups: (i) those whose labor standards are
consistent with the ILO conventions after rati¯cation, and (ii) those whose labor standards
continue to be lower than the international standard.
Interestingly, OECD (2000) provides a classi¯cation of countries based on the ex-
tent to which the ¯rst category of rights in Table 1 are violated in the period 1989 -
1999. The country ranking is based on a four-point score, indicating increasing degrees
of violation of the freedom of association and rights to organize, starting from a score
of 1 indicating severe violations to a score of 4, in which protection is deemed adequate.
We apply this information to our framework for estimating the probability of rati¯cation
of C98. Based on the information in OECD (2000), we construct interaction terms that
allow the sign and size of development peer e®ects to take on di®erent values for countries
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with these four levels of enforcement violations. For example, the explanatory variable
en1cdev98 = en1 £ cdev98 where en1 is a dummy variable indicating a country with a
score of 1 according to the OECD (2000) study. en1cdev98 thus represents the develop-
ment peer e®ect for countries for the severest level of violation. A dummy variable endum
is introduced to the estimation control for other unobserved characteristics of countries
9that are selected into the OECD study.
Table 9 summarizes our ¯ndings. The results are broadly consistent with our discus-
sion on the distinction between developed and developing countries above. In particular,
peer e®ects are positive and signi¯cant only for ¯rst two groups of countries that are clas-
si¯ed as not fully complying (1, and 2). Meanwhile, the estimated hazard ratio for the two
groups of countries with highest levels of compliance are not signi¯cant in the 10 percent
level. In addition to these ¯ndings, education is positive and statistically signi¯cant, and
likewise are legal origins of the Scandinavian civil variety. As is the case with all of the
rest of our speci¯cations, socialist countries are late adopters.
5 Summary and Conclusion
The starting point for this paper was the issue of using the rati¯cation of ILO Conventions
as a labor standards variable explaining economic performance { a common practice in
the empirical literature. The implicit assumption underlying this practice is of course that
the rati¯cation of ILO Conventions provides information on domestic labor standards. We
developed a framework in which the decision to ratify a Convention is made simultaneously
with the decision of how much to enforce it. The analysis suggested two key determinants
of rati¯cation { the factors determining the \natural" standard for a country, and those
determining the costs of deviating from the international standard when the country did
and did not ratify the Convention. Following on from this, we reasoned that if we did
¯nd systematic determinants of rati¯cation empirically, this would be evidence that (i)
9There are thus ¯ve groups of countries. The ¯rst four correspond to the OECD (2000) compliance
classi¯cation, the ¯fth includes countries in our sample but whose enforcement record is not documented
in OECD (2000). The dummy variable endum is equal to 1 for the ¯rst four groups of countries, and 0 for
the ¯fth.
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there were costs to violation when countries rati¯ed, and that on average countries were
violating standards they had signed on to, and (ii) that countries that rati¯ed did have
higher domestic standards than those that did not. This last point is clearly of some im-
portance to the large and growing empirical literature on labor standards and economic
performance that uses the readily available rati¯cation data.
The theoretical discussion suggested several variables as determinants of rati¯cation:
per capita income, openness, education, urbanization, political rights, peer e®ects and le-
gal systems. The empirical analysis ¯nds systematic determinants of rati¯cation, thereby
con¯rming, for these four Conventions, that there are costs to violating rati¯ed standards,
and that rati¯cation is indeed an indicator of higher domestic standards. There is there-
fore some justi¯cation for using rati¯cation as a proxy for higher domestic standards.
However, many empirical studies go further than this { they add up the number of
Conventions rati¯ed, implicitly assuming them to be perfect substitutes. But the empiri-
cal analysis shows varied patterns in the determinants for rati¯cation, which suggests that
these four Conventions are not substitutes in a simple way. The legal system variables
explain rati¯cation in all but one speci¯cation. The economic variables are not signi¯-
cant in all but a very few speci¯cations. Peer e®ects are signi¯cant for two of the four
Conventions. The fact that standard economic variables are not signi¯cant determinants
of rati¯cation should lead us to reconsider carefully many of the current theories of the
determinants of labor standards. The signi¯cance of peer e®ects supports the hypothesis
of \strategic complementarity" in the adoption of labor standards, the theoretical impli-
cations of which have been investigated in Chau and Kanbur (2000). The linkage between
origins of the legal system and rati¯cation will bear further investigation { countries with
legal origins which are correlated with high government e±ciency and rule of law, turn out
to be favorably selected into the pool of early rati¯ers.
This paper has merely begun the analysis of the rati¯cation of ILO Conventions.
The empirical investigation shows that the signing of these Conventions is not random and
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meaningless. The evidence suggests that, on average, countries think about rati¯cation,
balance the costs and bene¯ts, and, when they ratify, they have higher standards than
when they do not. Further theoretical and empirical research is now needed to develop a
deeper understanding of the detailed determinants of the rati¯cation decision.
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Figure 1. Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (c98)
Figure 2. Abolition of Forced Labor (c105)
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Figure 5. Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (c98)
Figure 6. Abolition of Forced Labor (c105)
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Figure 7. Discrimination (c111)
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Table 1. Core ILO Conventions and Dates of Entry into Force
Freedom of association and the right to collectively bargain 
Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1950 (Convention No. 87)
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1951 (Convention No. 98)
The elimination of forced and compulsory labor 
Force Labor Convention, 1932  (Convention No. 29)
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1959 (Convention No. 105)
The elimination of employment discrimination 
Equal Remuneration Convention , 1953 (Convention No. 100)
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1960 (Convention No. 111)
The abolition of child labor 
Minimum Age Convention , 1976  (Convention No. 138)
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 2000 (Convention No. 182)
Table 2. Ratification of ILO Core Conventions
Country c98 (1951) c111 (1960) c105 (1959) c138 (1976) Developing** Independence* Legal Exports***
Right to Organize & Discrimination Abolition of Minimum Origin
 Collective Bargaining Forced Labor Age
ALGERIA 1962 1969 1969 1984 X 1962 French fuel
AUSTRIA 1951 1973 1958 2000 . German diversified
BANGLADESH 1972 1972 1972 NR X 1971 British diversified
BELGIUM 1953 1977 1961 1988 . French diversified
BENIN 1968 1961 1961 1997 X 1960 British services
BOLIVIA 1973 1977 1990 1993 X . French primary
BOTSWANA 1997 1997 1997 1997 X 1966 French primary
BRAZIL 1952 1965 1965 NR X . French diversified
CAMEROON 1962 1988 1962 NR X 1960 French diversified
CANADA NR 1964 1959 NR . British manu.
CENTRAL AFR.R. 1964 1964 1964 1999 X 1960 French diversified
CHAD 1961 1966 1961 NR X 1960 French primary
CHILE 1999 1971 1999 1999 X . French primary
CHINA NR NR NR 1999 X . Socialist manu.
COLOMBIA 1976 1969 1963 2001 X . French diversified
CONGO 1999 1999 1999 1999 X 1960 French primary
COSTA RICA 1960 1962 1959 1976 X . French diversified
DENMARK 1955 1960 1958 1999 . Scandinavian diversified
DOMINICAN REP. 1953 1964 1958 2000 X . French services
ECUADOR 1959 1962 1962 1999 X . French diversified
EGYPT 1954 1960 1958 1999 X . French services
EL SALVADOR NR 1995 1958 1996 X . French services
ETHIOPIA 1963 1966 1999 1999 X . French primary
FIJI 1974 NR 1974 NR X 1970 French services
FINLAND 1951 1970 1960 1976 . Scandinavian manu.
FRANCE 1951 1981 1969 1990 . French diversified
GABON 1961 1961 1961 NR X 1960 French fuel
GAMBIA 2000 2000 NR NR X 1965 French services
GERMANY, WEST 1956 1961 1959 1976 . German manu.
GUATEMALA 1952 1960 1959 1990 X . French primary
GUINEA-BISS 1977 1977 1977 NR X 1973 French primary
GUYANA 1966 1975 1966 1998 X 1966 French primary
HONDURAS 1956 1960 1958 1980 X . French primary
INDIA NR 1960 2000 NR X . British diversified
IRAN NR 1964 1959 NR X 1979 French fuel
IRELAND 1955 1999 1958 1978 . British manu.
ISRAEL 1957 1959 1958 1979 . British manu.
ITALY 1958 1963 1968 1981 . French manu.
JAMAICA 1962 1975 1962 NR X 1962 French services
JAPAN 1953 NR NR 2000 . German manu.
JORDAN 1968 1963 1958 1998 X . French services
KENYA 1964 NR 1964 1979 X 1963 French diversified
KOREA, REP. NR 1998 NR 1999 X . German manu.
LESOTHO 1966 1998 NR NR X 1966 Socialist services
MADAGASCAR 1998 1961 NR 2000 X 1960 French primary
MALAWI 1965 1965 1999 1997 X 1964 French primary
MALAYSIA 1961 NR NR 1997 X 1957 British diversified
MALI 1964 1964 1962 NR X 1960 British primary
MAURITANIA NR 1963 1997 NR X 1960 French primary
MAURITIUS 1969 NR 1969 1990 X 1968 French diversified
MEXICO NR 1961 1959 NR X . French diversified
MOROCCO 1957 1963 1966 2000 X 1956 Socialist diversified
MOZAMBIQUE 1996 1977 1977 NR X 1975 French diversified
MYANMAR NR NR NR NR X . Socialist primary
NEPAL 1996 1974 NR 1997 X . British services
NETHERLANDS 1993 1973 1959 1976 . French diversified
NEW ZEALAND NR 1983 1968 NR . British primary
NICARAGUA 1967 1967 1967 1981 X . French primary
NIGER 1962 1962 1962 1978 X 1960 French primary
NIGERIA 1960 NR 1960 NR X 1960 French fuel
NORWAY 1955 1959 1958 1980 . Scandinavian diversified
PAKISTAN 1952 1961 1960 NR X . British diversified
PANAMA 1966 1966 1966 2000 X . French services
PAPUA N.GUINEA 1976 2000 1976 2000 X 1975 French primary
PARAGUAY 1966 1967 1968 NR X . French primary
PERU 1964 1970 1960 NR X . French primary
PHILIPPINES 1953 1960 1960 1998 X . French diversified
PORTUGAL 1964 1959 1959 1978 . French diversified
QATAR NR 1976 NR NR 1971 French fuel
RWANDA NR 1981 1962 NR X 1962 Socialist primary
SAUDI ARABIA 1988 1978 1978 1995 X . British fuel
SENEGAL NR 1967 1961 NR X 1960 British diversified
SIERRA LEONE 1961 1966 1961 NR X 1961 French diversified
SINGAPORE 1965 NR NR NR 1965 British manu.
SOMALIA NR 1961 1961 NR X 1960 British primary
SOUTH AFRICA 1996 1997 1997 2000 X . British diversified
SPAIN 1977 1967 1967 1977 . French diversified
SRI LANKA 1972 1998 NR 2000 X . British diversified
SWAZILAND 1978 1981 1979 NR X 1968 French primary
SWEDEN 1950 1962 1958 1990 . Scandinavian manu.
SWITZERLAND 1999 1961 1958 1999 . German manu.
TANZANIA 1962 NR 1962 1998 X 1964 French primary
THAILAND NR NR 1969 NR X . British diversified
TOGO 1983 1983 1999 1984 X 1960 British primary
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 1963 1970 1963 NR X 1962 British fuel
TURKEY 1952 1967 1961 1998 X . French diversified
U.K. 1950 1999 1957 2000 . British services
U.S.A. NR NR 1991 NR . British diversified
UGANDA 1963 NR 1963 NR X 1962 Socialist primary
UNITED ARAB E. NR NR 1997 NR 1971 British fuel
URUGUAY 1954 1989 1968 1977 X . French diversified
VENEZUELA 1968 1971 1964 1987 X . French fuel
ZAMBIA 1996 1979 1965 1976 X 1964 Socialist primary
ZIMBABWE 1998 1999 1998 2000 X 1980 British primary
*NR: Not ratified as of March 2001. 
**Low or middle income countries as defined by the World Bank.
***Major export category:  Major exports are those that account for 50 percent or more of total exports of goods and services from one category, in the period 1988-92.  
The categories are: nonfuel primary (SITC 0,1,2,4, plus 68), fuels (SITC 3), manufactures (SITC 5 to 9, less 68), and services (factor and nonfactor service receipts plus 
workers' remittances). If no single category accounts for 50 percent or more of total exports, the economy is classified as diversified.
Source: World Development Report 1995
Table 3: Cox Regression:Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (c98)
Hazard Ratios I II III
rgdpch 0.999805 *** 0.999761 *** 0.999739 ***
(0.000088) (0.000085) (0.000088)
open 0.999030 0.997485 0.999603
(0.004447) (0.004556) (0.004410)
educ 1.007877 1.009132 ** 1.008863 **
(0.005040) (0.004094) (0.004568)
polity 1.017024 1.013779 1.014576
(0.022817) (0.022931) (0.021118)
urban 1.009698 1.018760 * 1.008839
(0.010200) (0.010862) (0.010375)
leg_french 1.140852 0.993414 0.848690
(0.438198) (0.365642) (0.307013)
leg_socialist 2.520E-15 *** 8.220E-16 *** 1.700E-16 ***
3.830E-15 1.140E-15 2.330E-16
leg_german 0.831957 0.888777 0.678457
(0.623241) (0.631562) (0.483051)
leg_scandinavian 3.050124 *** 4.328151 *** 2.584229 ***
(1.345746) (2.033472) (1.166613)
cex98 1.139001 ***
(0.055333)
cex98sq 0.995461 ***
(0.001821)
cdev98 1.084722 ***
(0.021435)
cdev98sq 0.999063 ***
(0.000235)
creg98 1.269674 ***
(0.069251)
creg98sq 0.990814 ***
(0.002131)
time98 1.332484 *** 1.517792 *** 1.457735 ***
(0.103551) (0.152002) (0.065225)
No. of observations 1323 1323 1323
No. of ratifications 65 65 65
Log Likelihood -248.483 -244.112 -241.024
Wald chi^2 1133.800 1293.900 1099.850
Prob > chi^2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) in parenthesis.
Table 4: Cox Regression: Abolition of Forced Labor (c105)
Hazard Ratios I II III
rgdpch 1.000053 0.999986 1.000014
(0.000065) (0.000080) (0.000056)
open 1.002509 1.001143 1.002562
(0.003961) (0.004259) (0.004358)
educ 0.995340 1.001578 0.999879
(0.005620) (0.003863) (0.004823)
polity 0.991591 0.992517 1.000496
(0.021423) (0.020705) (0.020488)
urban 1.014142 1.014423 1.004497
(0.009627) (0.009197) (0.009362)
leg_french 1.169846 0.969721 0.893537
(0.379833) (0.322358) (0.296517)
leg_socialist 3.790E-15 *** 1.490E-15 *** 5.440E-16 ***
5.680E-15 2.160E-15 7.340E-16
leg_german 0.869469 0.579092 0.541137
(0.646604) (0.474966) (0.390753)
leg_scandinavian 2.544601 *** 2.971606 *** 1.761693 **
(0.793382) (1.014184) (0.475612)
cex105 1.107186 *
(0.060443)
cex105sq 0.997944
(0.001898)
cdev105 1.080976 ***
(0.023346)
cdev105sq 0.998986 ***
(0.000287)
creg105 1.235882 ***
(0.079700)
creg105sq 0.991132 ***
(0.002923)
time105 1.179074 *** 1.113979 *** 1.104457 ***
(0.033674) (0.077178) (0.019977)
No. of observations 930 930 930
No. of ratifications 72 72 72
Log Likelihood -276.569 -273.906 -273.456
Wald chi^2 1115.070 1171.550 1067.590
Prob > chi^2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) in parenthesis.
Table 5: Cox Regression: Discrimination (c111)
Full Sample
Hazard Ratios I II III
rgdpch 1.000048 1.000041 1.000023
(0.000059) (0.000066) (0.000058)
open 0.996141 0.995635 0.996800
(0.004319) (0.004237) (0.004075)
educ 0.999006 1.001147 1.002047
(0.006499) (0.006458) (0.006415)
polity 0.999968 1.000805 0.998167
(0.022531) (0.022760) (0.022151)
urban 0.995891 0.997884 0.992012
(0.010126) (0.009847) (0.010168)
leg_french 2.874382 *** 2.837655 *** 2.687574 ***
(1.100526) (1.101769) -1.017041
leg_socialist 1.830E-18 *** 1.480E-14 *** 3.480E-16 ***
1.750E-18 1.430E-14 3.600E-16
leg_german 2.211451 2.350498 2.116248
(1.366444) (1.565572) (1.311469)
leg_scandinavian 5.539186 *** 7.266973 *** 5.698458 ***
(2.885846) (3.883530) (3.170555)
cex111 1.006371
(0.073564)
cex111sq 1.000457
(0.002520)
cdev111 1.043943
(0.027676)
cdev111sq 0.999517
(0.000333)
creg111 1.030511
(0.037574)
creg111sq 0.999028
(0.000832)
time111 1.103181 ** 1.773914 *** 2.321572 ***
(0.048924) (0.110068) (0.160169)
No. of observations 1315 1315 1315
No. of ratifications 66 66 66
Log Likelihood -252.821 -251.616 -251.940
Wald chi^2 2336.170 2774.260 2348.200
Prob > chi^2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) in parenthesis.
Table 6: Cox Regression:Minimum Age Convention (c138)
Hazard Ratios I II III
rgdpch 1.000115 * 1.000010 1.000103
(0.000065) (0.000100) (0.000065)
open 1.003750 1.001554 1.003493
(0.003635) (0.004193) (0.003456)
educ 1.001357 1.000652 1.001235
(0.008243) (0.008583) (0.008307)
polity 1.032394 1.017429 1.021559
(0.036460) (0.036474) (0.033576)
urban 0.996745 1.002256 0.998631
(0.016400) (0.017245) (0.016310)
leg_french 4.550206 ** 3.776774 ** 3.343452 ***
(3.235685) (2.553433) (2.383641)
leg_socialist 2.310E-14 *** 1.110E-17 *** 4.940E-17 ***
2.810E-14 1.310E-17 5.930E-17
leg_german 1.180980 0.913889 0.878491
(1.536536) (1.101271) (1.161667)
leg_scandinavian 4.301139 * 3.420229 * 2.900743
(3.419872) (2.544211) (2.467271)
cex138 1.143655
(0.266864)
cex138sq 0.980741
(0.020406)
cdev138 0.654979
(0.234070)
cdev138sq 1.008501
(0.009538)
creg138 1.244767
(0.278420)
creg138sq 0.986094
(0.018086)
time138 1.939607 *** 3.750306 1.925397 ***
(0.108859) (0.808554) (0.105518)
No. of observations 1306 1306 1306
No. of ratifications 24 24 24
Log Likelihood -96.509 -96.255 -96.551
Wald chi^2 2893.130 2530.120 2992.000
Prob > chi^2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) in parenthesis.
Table 7: Cox Regression:Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (c98)
Hazard Ratios I II III
rgdpch 0.999782 ** 0.999669 *** 0.999701 ***
(0.000098) (0.000103) (0.000103)
open 0.999124 0.995877 0.999583
(0.004339) (0.004097) (0.004611)
educ 1.007711 1.009364 ** 1.009153 **
(0.005080) (0.004094) (0.004704)
polity 1.017129 1.021325 1.016798
(0.023128) (0.025160) (0.021557)
urban 1.008288 1.016210 * 1.006627
(0.010033) (0.009703) (0.010501)
leg_french 1.158489 1.090064 0.858109
(0.446729) (0.403301) (0.314329)
leg_socialist 2.810E-19 *** 4.250E-16 *** 1.580E-17 ***
4.240E-19 6.570E-16 2.330E-17
leg_german 0.794829 0.740385 0.591997
(0.568594) (0.509425) (0.419968)
leg_scandinavian 2.715532 *** 4.421451 *** 2.261950 *
(1.219512) (2.482845) (1.068172)
inc_developing 0.745824 0.802274 0.612702
(0.291105) (0.582806) (0.370194)
cex98 1.142112 *** 0.973542 1.026685
(0.056395) (0.056427) (0.053631)
cex98sq 0.995371 *** 0.999499 0.998680
(0.001845) (0.001892) (0.001824)
devcdev105 1.098928 ***
(0.025645)
devcdev105sq 0.999081 ***
(0.000266)
ndevcdev98 1.248424
(0.175533)
ndevcdev98sq 0.9962253
(0.006165)
devcreg98 1.266716 ***
(0.079658)
devcreg98sq 0.991073 ***
(0.002378)
ndevcreg98 1.191071
(0.205721)
ndevcreg98sq 0.995728
(0.012086)
time98 1.451454 *** 1.782031 *** 1.534007 ***
(0.153000) (0.094271) (0.040721)
No. of observations 1323 1323 1323
No. of ratifications 65 65 65
Log Likelihood -248.290 -241.324 -240.40134
Wald chi^2 1459.270 1754.940 2234.74
Prob > chi^2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) in parenthesis.
Table 8: Cox Regression:Abolition of Forced Labor (c105)
Hazard Ratios I II III
rgdpch 1.000043 0.999962 0.999989
(0.000069) (0.000101) (0.000058)
open 1.002570 1.002236 1.002967
(0.003944) (0.004321) (0.004059)
educ 0.995229 0.999802 0.997480
(0.005703) (0.004379) (0.005526)
polity 0.991830 0.991124 0.989092
(0.021481) (0.022036) (0.021267)
urban 1.013501 1.014299 1.011646
(0.009727) (0.009399) (0.010092)
leg_french 1.177116 1.008091 0.917129
(0.378602) (0.328389) (0.313320)
leg_socialist 3.630E-15 *** 2.770E-13 *** 1.370E-15 ***
5.420E-15 4.69E-13 2.09E-15
leg_german 0.837971 0.720785 0.777968
(0.618865) (0.553160) (0.566224)
leg_scandinavian 2.401866 *** 2.635517 *** 2.198110 ***
(0.840632) (1.079634) 0.850140
inc_developing 0.869839 0.652846 0.814786
(0.303241) (0.365545) (0.394684)
cex105 1.107561 ** 0.973157 1.047169
(0.060200) (0.081948) (0.073591)
cex105sq 0.997933 1.001928 1.000020
(0.001892) (0.002628) (0.002404)
devcdev105 1.095750 ***
(0.037660)
devcdev105sq 0.998732 ***
(0.000424)
ndevcdev105 1.177152
(0.135850)
ndevcdev105sq 0.9943977
(0.005262)
devcreg105 1.199455 ***
(0.108106)
devcreg105sq 0.991621 ***
(0.003831)
ndevcreg105 1.138974
(0.221296)
ndevcreg105sq 0.996441
(0.012603)
time105 1.748721 *** 1.795862 *** 1.287702 ***
(0.292842) (0.219649) (0.127264)
No. of observations 930 930 930
No. of ratifications 72 72 72
Log Likelihood -276.524 -272.351 -270.943
Wald chi^2 1143.940 1376.870 1178.490
Prob > chi^2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) in parenthesis.
Table 9: Cox Regression: Rights to Organize and Collective Bargaining (c98)
Hazard Ratios I
rgdpch 0.999824
(0.000114)
open 0.997598
(0.004768)
educ 1.010067 **
(0.005192)
polity 1.027694
(0.022082)
urban 1.014768
(0.010592)
leg_french 1.088870
(0.445914)
leg_socialist 3.660E-14 **
6.150E-14
leg_german 1.303191
(0.973683)
leg_scandinavian 5.233868 ***
(2.668160)
cex98 1.119705 **
(0.059184)
cex98sq 0.995877 **
(0.001824)
endum 0.325568 ***
(0.136712)
en1cdev98 1.707917 ***
(0.153322)
en1cdev98sq 0.990582 ***
(0.069830)
en2cdev98 1.087003 ***
(0.028303)
en2cdev98sq 0.999063 ***
(0.000358)
en3cdev98 1.046723
(0.032957)
en3cdev98sq 0.999395
(0.000447)
en4cdev98 1.029698
(0.069830)
en4cdev98sq 1.000004
(0.000988)
time98 1.522216 ***
(0.140584)
No. of observations 1323
No. of ratifications 65
Log Likelihood -239.467
Wald chi^2 845.650
Prob > chi^2 0.000
Robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) in parenthesis.
